Wednesday, 1 August 2012

Confessions of an evil man

TWO ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF BEING A DICK



FIRST ARGUMENT: MORALITY IN AN IMPERFECT UNIVERSE



Three preliminary points:

1.) Imperfect things have imperfect value.

2.)The universe in imperfect.
3.) People belong to the universe thus they are imperfect, and their wllbeing has finite value.

PROOF OF 2


FOR THE PERFECT UNIVERSE TO BE ACTUALISED THE FOLLOWING KEY DESIRES MUST BE FULFILLED:

a.) We do not want to be ultimately accountable to somebody else – we want pure free will: Atheism

= Plausibly true at this world

b.) We do not want the universe to be dependent on our thoughts – we want the external to be real: anti-idealism

= Plausibly true at this world

c.) We do not want to know we live forever - If we knew we lived forever life would be meaningless thus we want a period of forgetfulness between lives: reincarnation

= Not necessarily false in this world

d.) We do not want to suffer unnecessarily

= It is almost certain we do suffer unnecessarily

CONCLUSION: IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT SOME OF THE ABOVE KEY DESIRES ARE UNFULFILLED THUS
THIS IS NOT THE PERFECT UNIVERSE


From 1,2,3,: A slippery slope. 


If it is morally justifiable to spend 99.99999...% of my energy on morality then it is morally justified to spend 99.9998…% of my energy on morality. Because of the insignificant difference between the two figures.

- It is morally justifiable to spend 99.99999...% of my energy on morality because people's wellbeing has finite value.

It is morally justifiable to spend 99.999998...% of my energy on morality
THUS

It is morally justifiable to spend 99.9997…% of my energy on morality. BY TRANSITIVITY OF RULE

Etc. etc.


It is morally justifiable to spend 5.99999999...% of my energy on morality

THUS it is morally justifiable to spend 5.9999999998…% of my energy on morality.


Conclusion: I can be a dick



ARGUMENT 2 THE ARGUMENT FROM SELF-PRESERVATION

2.) It is justified to hurt somebody a little to avoid a very large amount of pain yourself– SOME VALUE COMMENSUARABILTY

OR At some point avoiding pain becomes objectively more important than a little immorality.


2. a) Slippery Slope

If I can hurt somebody for 1 unit of pain in order to avoid 45000 units of pain myself I should do so.

If it is morally justifiable to inflict 1 unit of pain on somebody in order to avvoid 45000 units of pain then it is morally justifiable to inflict 1 unit of pain in order to avoid 45999 units of pain. As the difference is insignificant.


Etc. etc.
THUS BY TRANSITIVITY OF RULE

- If I can hurt somebody for 1 unit of pain in order to avoid  0.1 units of pain myself I should do so. 

Conclusion:I can be a dick


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